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CAPTCHA is a web-based authentication method used by websites to distinguish between humans (valid 
users) and bots(attackers). Audio captcha is an accessible captcha meant for the visually disabled section 
of users such as color-blind, blind, near-sighted users. In this project, I analyzed the security of audio 
captchas from attacks that employ machine learning and deep learning models. Audio captchas of varying 
lengths (5, 7 and 10) and varying background noise (no noise, medium noise or high noise) were analyzed. 
I found that audio captchas with no background noise or medium background noise were easily attacked 
with 99% - 100% accuracy.  Whereas, audio captchas with high noise were relatively more secure with 
breaking accuracy of 85%. I also propose that adversarial example attacks can be used in favor of audio 
captcha, that is, adversarial example attacks can be used to defend audio captcha from attackers. I explored 
two adversarial examples attack algorithms: Basic Iterative Method (BIM) and DeepFool method to create 
new adversarial audio captcha. Finally, I analyzed the security of these newly created adversarial audio 
captcha by simulating Level I and Level II defense scenarios. Level I defense is a defense against pre-
trained models that have never seen adversarial examples before. Whereas a Level II defense is a defense 
against models that have been re-trained on adversarial examples. My experiments show that Level I 
defense can prevent nearly 100% of attacks from pre-trained models. It also proves that Level II defense 
increases security of audio captcha by 57% to 67%. Real world scenarios such as multi-retries are  also 
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AE: Adversarial Examples 
CAPTCHA: Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans 
Apart 
CNN: Convolutional Neural Network 
DL: Deep Learning 
 
DTC: Decision Tree Classifier 
 
GradBoost: Gradient Boosting 
ML: Machine Learning 
 
FE: Feature Extraction  
kNN: k-Nearest Neighbors  
RFC: Random Forest Classifier  
SVM: Support Vector Machine 
AdaBoost: Adaptive Boosting 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
CAPTCHA stands for Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans 
Apart. Captcha is a computer-generated challenge that is easy to solve by humans but difficult to solve 
by current computing systems. This characteristic of the captcha is often referred to as the captcha 
paradox, where a machine creates and scores a test that it itself should not pass [1]. It is a web-based 
authentication method and also the first line of defense used by websites to prevent bots from creating 
fake accounts or spamming. A bot is a malicious program that can perform repeated tasks automatically 
over the internet and thus creating problems in the network.  
The web is a universal medium for communication and sharing that should be accessible by every 
human alike. Deploying only visual captchas creates a considerable obstacle to a certain group of users, 
such as the visually impaired, color-blind, near sighted users [2]. This necessitates the need for more 
accessible captchas such as audio captcha shown in Figure 1. But, with the advancements in machine 
learning and deep learning it is now possible to train speech to text models that can attack audio captcha 
and solve them like humans. The attackers can train their own attack models or use publicly available 
models to create DoS, DDoS attacks that compromise the availability of the websites that use audio 
captchas. Hence, it is important to study and analyze the different models and techniques that can be 
used to break audio captcha and the ways in which these attacks can be prevented. 
Breaking audio captcha means that an attack model (could be a machine learning model or deep 
learning model) is able to identify what digits are spoken in the audio captcha. For example, if the 
digits 3 4 5 2 1 are spoken in the audio captcha, the attack model should identify the digits 3 4 5 2 1. If 
the attack models are correctly able to identify each digit , then , we can say that the attack model has 
broken the audio captcha. We can also say that  the attack model was successful at attacking or breaking 





Adversarial Examples Attacks are algorithms that create well-crafted noise intended to fool a deep 
learning or machine learning model. Currently, these adversarial examples are used to attack models, 
hence the name Adversarial Examples Attack. These adversarial examples are crafted in a way such 
that the perturbations or changes to the image or audio is imperceptible to humans, but they can fool 
the models into classifying them incorrectly. The main contributions of this project are as follows:  
• Audio captcha of varying lengths and background noise are created. This allows us to analyze a 
variety of audio captcha and understand what features make an audio captcha more secure.  
• Multiple machine learning, and deep learning models are trained to attack the audio captcha. 
Experiment results prove that audio captchas are not secure.  
• A novel method of creating audio captcha is proposed. This method uses adversarial audio to create 
audio captcha. Normal audio captcha is generated using recorded human voice (reading out numbers 
or alphabets) and adding random noise to it. 
• Security of the newly generated adversarial audio captcha is studied and analyzed. Resilience of 
adversarial audio captcha against machine learning and deep learning attacks is analyzed by simulating 
Level I and Level II defense scenarios. Defense against pre-trained attack models that were trained on 
normal audio datasets and have never encountered adversarial examples before is referred to as Level 
I defense mechanism in this project. Level II defense is simulated by re-training attack models on 
adversarial audio captcha as well.  
 





Section II briefly describes the background and previous work in the field of attacking audio captcha 
that helped in getting started with the project. Section III describes the datasets used and their feature 
extraction process. In Section IV, details of the attack models and their architecture are discussed. 
Section V reviews the concepts of adversarial examples. In Section VI, the proposed solution of this 
project is explained. In Section VII, the experimental setup and results from attacking audio captcha 




CHAPTER 2. Related Work 
 
This section reviews research work that has previously been performed for attacking audio captcha. 
In reference [3] the authors break the task of solving an entire captcha into sub tasks of first segmenting 
the audio file and then predicting spoken digits/alphabets. Segmentation and labelling are performed 
using manual effort for training dataset whereas a fixed size window is used for segmenting the test 
data audio. The project implements AdaBoost with decision stumps, SVM with RBF kernel and K 
Nearest Neighbors (K-NN) to predict the captchas. For an exact match condition SVM gives the highest 
accuracy of 67%. Whereas, for one mistake passing condition, SVM gives the highest accuracy of 92% 
among all models.  K-NN gives the lowest accuracy for both one mistake and exact match passing 
conditions. 
In reference [4], the authors aimed to break eBay’s audio captcha using their prototype Decaptcha. 
At the time of the experiments eBay used audio captcha with 6 digits between 0 to 9 spoken by multiple 
people with different genders, accents and background noise levels. Using Decaptcha the paper was 
able to break 75% of eBay’s audio captchas. 
Reference [5] investigates the security of Google’s continuous audio captcha using Hidden Markov 
Models. The continuous audio captcha contained two kinds of distortion: challenge distortion and digit 
distortion.  Challenge distortion is a static noise that is added for the entire duration of the audio, 
whereas digit distortion is a noise applied to each digit. The audio captcha contained nine spoken digits 
clustered in three groups of three digits each. The results are evaluated off-by-one accuracy, strict 
accuracy (all digits labelled correctly), per-cluster accuracy, per-digit accuracy and N-segment 
accuracy. The off-by-one accuracy for new test data is 52% but the strict accuracy stands at 17%. The 
per-digit classifier does better at 76%. The authors also experimented by providing the model with the 
ground truth number of digits in each cluster, this increased off-by-one accuracy for new test data to 
58% and strict accuracy to 27%. 




attackers to break audio captchas with very high accuracy. The paper tested the speech recognition 
models on various popular captcha service providers such as Recaptcha v2.0, Recaptcha v2.1, Apple, 
etc. Google’s Cloud Speech to text (US accent) performs the best with an accuracy of 98.3% on its 
own Recaptcha v2.0 and with an accuracy of 83.9% on Recaptcha v2.1. Recaptcha audio captcha have 








To completely analyze security of audio captcha, 9 different audio captcha datasets are generated 
as shown in Table I. To create these datasets, I collected audio of people speaking out the digits [0-9]. 
Six different speakers are used with different genders and accents. I implemented algorithms that joined 
these audio files to create audio captcha of varying lengths. The audio files are mixed at random 
intensities and random speeds to create realistic audio captcha. Background noise such as static noise, 
bell or beeping noise, etc. are scattered throughout the length of the audio captcha. All audio captchas 
are made up of spoken digits between 0 to 9.  
 Broadly, the 9 datasets can be placed into three major buckets based on the kind of background 
noise present in the dataset. These three buckets are: no background noise datasets, medium 
background noise datasets and high background noise datasets.  
No Noise Datasets: Three datasets with no noise in the background are referred to as no noise 
datasets. These three datasets contain audio captchas of length 5, 7 and 10 respectively. 
Medium Noise Datasets: Another three datasets of length 5, 7 and 10 with some noise are referred 
to as medium background noise datasets. Medium background noise refers to addition of static noise 
and few bells/beeps in the entire duration of the audio captchas.  
High Noise Datasets: Lastly, three datasets of length 5, 7 and 10 are created with high noise in the 
background. High noise refers to static white noise, bell/beep sound in addition to audio files played in 
reverse at random speeds in background. The combination of these noise is spread across the entire 
duration of the audio captcha.  
Irrespective of the intensity of background noise, it is ensured that the audio captcha is clearly 






Table 1: AUDIO CAPTCHA DATASET 
 
 
3.2 Feature Extraction 
Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC) is considered a standard method to extract features 
from audio and is widely used in automatic speech-to-text models [4, 6]. The Mel Frequency uses a 
non-linear scale, which is approximately linear for frequencies below 1 KHz and logarithmic for 
frequencies above 1 KHz [7]. The motivation for such scale comes from analyzing how human auditory 
systems are selective towards sound waves of different frequencies. The Mel-scale relates perceived 
frequency to the actual measured frequency. The formula to convert a frequency to Mel-Scale is as 
below: 
 






The discrete Fourier Transform of a frame is obtained using the following formula below where 1≤ 












MFCC is used for extracting features in this project. Figure 2 shows the process followed to extract 
MFCC features from audio files. 
 
 





















CHAPTER 4. Attack Models 
 
4.1 Machine Learning Attack Models 
 
I used four different machine learning models to attack audio captchas. These models were Support 
Vector Classifiers (SVC), Random Forest Classifier (RFC), AdaBoost with RFC as base classifier, and 
Gradient Boosting algorithm. 
Support Vector Classifier – SVC is a powerful supervised learning algorithm that is used for 
classification, regression and novelty detection. The goal of SVC is twofold, it first aims to find a 
hyperplane that linearly separates the training data. Then, it aims to maximize the minimum distance 
between the hyperplane and any data of the training set, that is, it tries to maximize the margin [8]. 
Often to achieve this goal, a kernel function is used that moves data to a higher dimension. SVCs have 
been used to differentiate between noise and target audio data earlier [9] implements SVC for audio 
stream recorded in vehicles during different driving conditions. I used SVC for multi-class 
classification of audio data. 
Random Forest Classifier (RFC) – Random Forest Classifier algorithm is an ensemble method 
for classification or regression that uses decision tree as base classifier. [10] uses RFC for wildlife 
intruder detection by classifying audio consisting of birds, gunshots, chainsaw, tractors and human 
voice. For this project, I also applied RFC to our audio captcha dataset to classify digits from 0 to 9. 
Adaptive Boosting Algorithm – Also referred to as AdaBoost algorithm, it is used in conjunction 
with other machine learning models (often referred to as weak learners). AdaBoost is an adaptive 
learning model that uses weak learners to classify data points. The misclassified data points are 
assigned higher weights in the subsequent iterations till the algorithm learns to best classify all data 
points. [11] uses AdaBoost to classify audio data in complex audio environments. In this project, I use 
AdaBoost in conjunction with RFC to classify audio captcha data. 
Gradient Boosting Algorithm – Similar to RFC and AdaBoost, gradient boosting algorithm also 




stronger prediction models. This method works in stages to optimize the arbitrary loss functions that 
are differentiable. I experimented with gradient boost algorithms to classify audio captcha dataset. 
 
4.2 Deep Learning Attack Models 
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have proven to perform extremely well in the field of 
image classification. Recent work in audio classification [12] shows promise in the field of audio 
classification as well. I used four different CNN models to attack audio captchas. I did not use 
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) since RNNs are meant for time-series data where there is a relation 
between datapoints. In case of audio captchas, the digits are spoken randomly and have no relation 
among each other. Hence, I experimented with below four CNN models: cnn-1, cnn-2, cnn-3, vgg. 
cnn-1 - [13] uses cnn models for small footprint keywork spotting task in audio. I implemented the 
cnn architecture which is referred to as cnn-one-fpool and call it cnn-1. This architecture consists of 
one cnn layer and two dense layers followed by a SoftMax layer.  








cnn-2 – I used a second cnn model again from reference [13] which consists of two convolution 
layers and two dense layers followed by a SoftMax layer. This model is similar to the model named 
cnn-trad-fpool3 except that I have added an additional dense layer to the architecture.  
Conv2D(32, kernel_size=(2, 2), activation='relu') 












cnn-3 – I created my own cnn architecture which is an extension of cnn-2 model. cnn-3 model 
consists of three convolution layers and two dense layers followed by a SoftMax layer. Below is a 
representation of the model. 
Conv2D(32, kernel_size=(2, 2), activation='relu') 
BatchNormalization() 
Conv2D(48, kernel_size=(2, 2), activation='relu')) 
BatchNormalization() 












vgg – To experiment with much larger cnn models I chose the VGG classifier from [12] which 
consists of 16 layers ( 13 convolution layers and 3 dense layers) followed by a SoftMax layer. This is 

















CHAPTER 5. Adversarial Examples 
 
 Machine learning, and deep learning models are highly expressive models that learn from 
data. But studies in [13] show that the models learn from the space rather than the individual units. 
Also, the input-output mapping is quite discontinuous which leaves room for introducing small 
imperceptible perturbation that can result in misclassification of data. Utilizing this understanding [14, 
15] created adversarial examples attack algorithms that generate adversarial examples. Adversarial 
examples are created by adding well-crafted noise/perturbations to original/clean data which are not 
interpretable by humans. But, these adversarial examples can fool machine learning and deep learning 
models to misclassify them. 
In our use case, deep learning models or machine learning models are used to attack audio captcha, 
hence, it makes sense to explore the use of adversarial examples to defend audio captcha from attacks. 
I created adversarial audio using two popular adversarial examples attack algorithms, Basic Iterative 
Method (BIM) and DeepFool method. 
Basic Iterative Method (BIM):  BIM method iteratively implements Fast Gradient Sign Method 
[15] to create adversarial audio. The original data is updated based on the gradient value of the loss. In 
equation 3, e stands for epsilon. 
 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀 + 𝑒𝑒 ∗ 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛(𝑙𝑙𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)  (3) 
 
Deepfool Method:  To create adversarial examples, deep fool method aims to minimize L2 distance 
but also switch classes. It iteratively finds the minimum perturbation that will result in class switch. In 
each iteration the method calculates L2 distance between the adversary and the original sample as 
shown in equation 4. 
 





CHAPTER 6. Proposed Solution 
By performing attack experiments on audio captcha this project proves that no noise and medium 
noise datasets are very easy to attack, whereas high noise audio captcha must be longer to ensure some 
security. The findings of the project show that there is need for more secure forms of audio captcha. 
To do this, the following is proposed: 
•  A Level I defense mechanism is proposed as shown in Figure 3, that defends against pre-
trained machine learning or deep learning attack models that were trained on normal audio 
datasets and have never encountered adversarial examples before. 
• Also, a Level II defense mechanism is proposed that is a defense against re-trained machine 
learning or deep learning models as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. These attack models 
have retrained themselves on adversarial examples. 
6.1 Level I Defense Mechanism  
I use Adversarial Examples attack algorithms such as BIM and Deep Fool to create new adversarial 
audio. These adversarial audios are joined together to form audio captcha of varying length. The pre-
trained attack models such as SVM, RFC, CNNs have not been trained on any adversarial examples. 
The hypothesize is that when such pre-trained models attack the newly generated adversarial audio 
captcha, the attacks should fail. To simulate these experiments, I used all eight pre-trained attack 







Figure 3: Proposed Level I Defense Architecture 
 
6.2 Level II Defense Mechanism  
Reference [16] shows that retraining deep learning models or machine learning models on all 
adversarial examples is very costly and not completely possible. This is because infinite number of 
adversarial examples can be created with extremely small perturbations to the original data. This means 
that retraining on such data is both costly and never fully possible. On the contrary, creating adversarial 
audio is not costly, hence we can create multiple sets of adversarial audios using different adversary 
creation techniques. This concept is used to create a level II defense strategy.  
To create a level II defense, multiple sets of adversarial examples should be created using different 
adversary generation techniques (e.g.: BIM, DeepFool) and different amounts of perturbations. Audio 





To analyze the security of level II defense, I set up the experiments in two different ways as 
mentioned below in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2.  
Scenario 1: The experiment is set up as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. This scenario assumes 
that the attacker does not have access to all versions/types of adversarial audio. Hence, the attacker re-
trains its attack model on few adversarial audio datasets. Figure 4 shows the re-training phase for the 
attacker. The attacker can retrain their attack models on normal audio and a subset of adversarial audio 
datasets. In the experiments, I chose two adversarial audio sets at random for re-training. A five-fold 
cross validation method was used, where I performed the experiments five times. Each time a different 
subset of adversary audio datasets was used for retraining along with the normal audio datasets.  
Figure 5 shows the attack phase when, the attack model from Figure 4, is used to attack audio 
captcha. To create the test audio captcha, the algorithm randomly select audio from any of the 
adversarial sets and join them to form audio captcha of length 5, 7 or 10.  
Scenario 2: This scenario simulates a real-world situation where the attacker accumulates the 
adversarial audio captcha over time and retrains their model on these adversarial audio data as well. In 
this scenario, we believe that the attacker can retrain their attack model on all available audio datasets 
as shown in Figure 6. To do this, the attacker either collects the adversarial audio samples or creates 
its own adversarial audio samples of all possible types. This scenario can give us a concrete proof of 
how secure adversarial audio captcha are. To understand the robustness of adversarial audio captcha 
against attacks, the experiment is set up as following: The attacker collects/creates samples of all 
adversarial audio datasets. The sample size ranges from 5% of the audio dataset up to 80% of the audio 
dataset. The remaining 20% is used for testing, the test process is same as shown in Figure 5.  To create 
the test audio captcha, the algorithm randomly select audio from any of the adversarial sets and join 







Figure 4: Proposed Level II Defense Architecture (Re-Training Phase) – Scenario 1 
 
 

























CHAPTER 7.  Performance Evaluation 
In this section, the experiment results from attacking and defending audio captcha are discussed 
7.1 Experiment Setup 
For attacks I use SVM, RFC, AdaBoost, Gradient Boost, three versions of CNN models as discussed 
in Section IV and VGG model. For defense, I use adversarial generation methods BIM and DeepFool. 
The architecture of defense is shown in Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6. To run the experiments I used python, 
keras and pytorch for creating both attack and defense models. I used Intel® Core™ i7 with 2.80 GHz 
CPU and 16 GB RAM. 
7.2 Attack Results 
Figure 7 displays the attacking accuracies of machine learning models on audio captchas. No noise 
audio captchas of any length can be attacked with 100% accuracy. Medium noise audio captcha can be 
attacked with 98% (length 5) to 95.64 % (length 10) accuracy. High Noise audio captcha can be 
attacked with highest accuracy of 62.61% (length 5) to 29.96 % (length 10).  
Figure 8 displays the attacking accuracies of deep learning models on audio captchas. No noise audio 
captchas of any length can be attacked with 100% accuracy. Medium noise audio captcha can be 
attacked with 98.40% (length 5) to 97 % (length 10) accuracy. High Noise audio captcha can be 










































































7.3 Defense Results 
Below are the attack accuracies after applying Level I and Level II defense mechanism. Figure 9 
shows the attack results after Level I defense mechanism has been applied to audio captcha, that is, the 
attacks have been performed on adversarial audio captcha generated using BIM and DeepFool 
methods.  
Figure 10 shows the attack results on Level II defense – Scenario 1. For audio captcha of length 5 
the attacking models could break the captcha with average accuracy of 36%. Audio captcha of length 
7 could be broken with average accuracy of 31%. Whereas audio captcha of length 10 could be broken 
with average accuracy of 25% 
Figure 11 shows that with 5% samples of each adversarial audio dataset the attack accuracy is only 
20% for captcha of length 10 and 40% for captcha of length 5. The attack accuracy increases as the 
sample space increases to 35%, where the attack accuracy is 65.11% for length 10 captcha and 78% 
for length 5 captcha. After this, the increase in attack accuracy stagnates and even decreases slightly 
after 55%. Even after all available audio datasets (80% of each audio dataset) are used to re-train the 
attack models, the attack accuracy is lower (72% for len 10, 82% for len 5) than the attack accuracy on 
normal audio datasets (100% on no/medium noise captcha of any length and 75% for length 10 high 
noise, 85% for length 5 high noise). The results show that adversarial audio captcha is more robust as 
compared to normal audio.  
 
 




















Attack on Level I Defense







Figure 10: Attack accuracy on Level II defense (Scenario 1) 
 
 
          

























Attack On Level II Defense




























CHAPTER 8. Defense Mechanism in Realistic Scenarios 
In the real-world, audio captchas, specially the captchas with background noise are tuff to 
understand for humans as well. To ensure, that humans do not suffer due to such difficulties, most 
websites offer up to three chances to correctly identify the digits in an audio captcha. This feature can 
have implications for breaking audio captcha as well, since now the attacker too gets up to three trials to 
break the audio captcha. In this section we discuss the attack accuracy of models considering the multiple 
retry feature and propose few related defense mechanisms.  
Before moving further, we discuss the definitions of independent and dependent events and 
explore some basic understanding of probability related to the project. Two events are independent of each 
other if, the probability that one occurs does not impact the probability of the other event. For example, 
rolling a die and flipping a coin. Both events are completely independent of each other. Whereas, two 
events are called dependent events if the probability of one event’s occurrence is  dependent on another 
event. For example, if we draw two cards from a deck of 52 cards without replacing them, then, the 
probability of drawing an ace on the second draw depends on whether an ace was drawn on the first try. In 
the scenario of an audio captcha with three retries, we can say that the three retries are independent of 
each other. To be successful at breaking audio captcha, the attacker can get three trials to identify the 
captcha correctly. Hence, if the probability of breaking an audio captcha in one trial is x, then the 
probability of breaking the audio captcha in at least one of the three trials can be calculated as following.  
Probability of not being successful in all three trials = (1 − 𝑁𝑁)3 
Probability of being successful in at least one of three trials = 1 - (1 − 𝑁𝑁)3 
Using this information, we can recalculate the attack accuracy of all machine learning and deep learning 
models. We get the attack accuracy as shown in Figure 12 and 13. Figure 12 shows the attack accuracy 
using machine learning models and Figure 13 shows the attack accuracy using deep learning models. The 
results show that, given three trials all audio captcha including no noise, medium noise and high noise can 




newly generated adversarial audio captcha. The results prove that given three trials adversarial audio 
captcha are also not strong defense. Hence, the need to handle the issue of multi-retries. In the following 
sub-sections, we discuss defense strategies for multi-retries. 
 
 



















































Figure 14: Multi trial attack accuracy on adversarial audio captcha 
 
 
8.1 Defense Mechanism : Doubling the wait time 
 
As seen in figure 12, 13 and 14, providing the option of three retries increases the attack accuracy 
of both machine learning and deep learning models. It also means that attacker has more opportunity to 
collect the adversarial audio captchas for retraining. To prevent easier collection and higher attack 
accuracy following is proposed. Websites can track the potential customer’s IP address. After the first 
unsuccessful trial, the wait time for the next trial should be doubled. For example, if using a certain IP 
address, a user starts creating an account and is unsuccessful at the first try, the wait time should be 
doubled for each extra trial. This wait time should increase even when the next account is being created 
using the same IP address. Hence, if the general wait time was  5 seconds, on the second trial the wait 
time becomes 10 seconds, followed by 20, 40, 80 seconds and so on. Increasing the wait time will 
prevent the attacker from collecting huge samples of adversary data. If the attacker can collect only 5% of 
the adversary data, the attack accuracy will be around 45% for audio captcha of length 10 and 80% for 
audio captcha of length 5. But, there is still a scope to create stronger defense mechanism. In the 
























8.2 Defense Mechanism : Round Robin / Random captcha generation 
 
To prevent attackers from accumulating huge samples of adversarial audio data, websites can 
create adversarial audio captcha by using adversarial audio datasets in a round robin or random fashion. 
In previous sections, we had proposed that audio captcha should be created by joining audio at random 
from any of the 12 adversarial audio datasets. In this defense mechanism we propose that instead of 
giving away on all adversarial sets at once, the captcha can be created by using subsets. At periodic 
interval these subsets can be changed. In this case, even if the attacker accumulates adversarial audio 
captcha and retrains on them, after a period, the datasets using which captcha is generated will be 
changed. At this point, the attackers retraining will become futile. To understand the results of such a 
scenario, we setup the experiment as follows: In iteration 1, we choose two adversarial sets at random or 
in round robin fashion to create the audio captcha for test. For the next iteration, we assume that the 
attacker has accumulated these adversarial audio datasets (the ones used for test) and retrained on them. 
But, we now create audio captcha using 2 different adversarial audio datasets. These can be chosen at 
random from the remaining datasets or in a round robin manner. Performing this for 5 iterations we get 
results as shown in Figure 15. This method proves to be successful at preventing attacks, with only one 
trial the attack accuracy is 30% for audio captcha of length 5 and 21% for audio captcha of length 10. 
Even with three trials the attack accuracy is still 65% for audio captcha of length 5 and 50% for audio 
captcha of length 10. As we can see that rotating the audio datasets after regular period is extremely 
helpful in creating successful defense mechanisms. Rotating datasets is an automatic work and needs no 





Figure 15: Attack Accuracy on using adversarial datasets in round robin to create audio captcha 
 
8.3 Defense Mechanism : Combination Method 
 
Given that both above defense mechanisms help in reducing the attack accuracy, it makes sense to 
combine the two. By combining the two defense mechanisms, following should be performed: 
1. IP address of users should be tracked and after each attempt to break audio captcha the wait 
time should be doubled. This will ensure lower collection of datasets which will in turn result 
in lower attack accuracy. 
2. To create audio captchas a subset of adversarial audio dataset should be used, after regular 
periods, the subset datasets should be changed. This choice of subset datasets can be random 




































CHAPTER 9. Conclusion 
Audio captcha is an accessible form of captcha that is deployed by websites to prevent abuse by 
spammers and bots. Though audio captchas are meant for the visually disabled section of users, they 
are available to all users alike. An attacker can target these audio captchas to create fake accounts, 
spam users, etc.  Hence, it is important to study the security of these audio captchas from attacks. 
Through this work I show that audio captcha is not secure and recognize the need for more secure 
forms of audio captcha. I proposed a new architecture that uses adversarial audio to make audio captcha 
secure against deep learning and machine learning attack models. On performing, Level I and Level II 
defense against attacks, I observed that L1 defense strategy prevents nearly 99.9% attacks from pre-
trained models. Whereas L2 defense prevents 64% attacks from re-trained models (on adversarial 
examples) for audio captcha of length 5, 69% attacks from re-trained models for audio captcha of 
length 7 and 75% attacks from re-trained models for audio captcha of length 10. Even when the attacker 
retrains its model on samples from all adversarial audio datasets, the attacking accuracy is still lower 
than that of normal audio captcha. This proves that adversarial audio captcha is more robust and 
resilient towards attacks from ML/DL models. I also explored real world scenarios where the users are 
given multiple chances to break the audio captcha. In such scenarios defense mechanisms such as 
tracking IP addresses, increasing wait time after each attempt at breaking the captcha, round robin 









CHAPTER 10. Future Work 
Security of audio captcha requires constant research. New and different methods of creating 
audio captcha need to be studied and applied to ensure security over longer period of time. 
Adversarial examples in general are used to attack a model, with increasing academic work in the 
field of adversarial examples, researchers are working to create more robust models that are not 
fooled by adversarial examples. Thus, there is a constant need to keep updating the methodology of 
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